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ABSTRACT 
Smart grids are essentially electrical grids that uses information and communication 
technology (ICT) to provide reliable, efficient electricity transmission and distribution. Security 
and trust are of paramount importance. Among various emerging security issues, false data 
injection (FDI) attack is one of the most substantial ones, which can significantly increase the 
cost of the energy distribution process. However, most current research focuses on 
countermeasures to FDIs for traditional power grids rather smart grid infrastructures. We develop 
an efficient and real-time scheme to detect FDI attacks in smart grids, by exploiting 
spatial-temporal correlations between grid components. Through realistic simulations based on 
the US smart grid, we demonstrate that the proposed scheme provides an accurate and reliable 
solution. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) embedded in the environment are used to monitor, 
understand behaviours of, and control, the physical world [1]. As a representative emerging CPS 
application, the proliferation of smart grids has been observed in our daily life. A smart grid is a 
relatively new type of energy distribution system that consists of not only the power lines as per 
traditional power grids, but information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructures 
connected to smart meters which may take the form of specialised devices, or laptops, cell phones 
etc. Some of these smart grid components allow information systems to perform prediction 
analysis, which balances the power production and consumption in the grid system. For example, 
real-time pricing gives both consumers and suppliers valuable indications to help manage their 
energy demands and supplies, respectively. Therefore, energy distribution (which controls the 
energy generation, consumption, and transmission processes) can be performed in a more 
dynamic and efficient manner [2] [5]. 
However, the heterogeneity, diversity, and complexity of smart-grid components pose a 
critical challenge in ensuring overall system integrity [2]. This is due to the fact that in smart 
grids, grid-status inference and moreover, decision making, can be performed on each local smart 
  
device rather than in a well-protected central control centre. Therefore, unlike traditional power 
grids where the majority of attacks and failures come from physical accesses to critical facilities 
[3], the ubiquity of smart-grid components further invites these abnormalities from 
cyber-infrastructures.  
A typical attack found in smart grids is false data injection (FDI), which can be used to 
distort real energy demand and supply figures. Energy distributions may therefore be erroneous, 
which results in additional costs or more devastating hazards. One example was the Northeast 
blackout of 2003 in USA caused by lack of accurate real-time condition information 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northeast_blackout_of_2003). 
It is imperative that we trust such systems and get the security right as national security, not 
just cyber-security, is at risk. However, recent countermeasures against FDIs focuses more on 
traditional power-grid scenarios [2], in which FDI attacks are launched at physical meters rather 
than smart components [3]. Without considering the cyber-attacks and the distributed design of 
smart grid infrastructures, such approaches may not be able to provide comprehensive protection 
that is immediate to each local smart meter or device making decisions based on status 
information. 
In response to this problem, we propose a lightweight approach that can be easily installed 
on any smart component for real-time FDI detection. Compared to traditional solutions, it 
identifies anomalies in state estimations (which are inferred from physical meter readings), as 
these state estimations are the ultimate targets for both traditional FDI attacks and cyber-attacks 
to compromise. Furthermore, our approach scales to large smart grid systems compared to other 
similar anomaly-detection mechanisms in cyber systems [4]. Results of simulations based on 
real-world data demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed approach in terms of reducing extra 
energy transmission costs and user outage rates caused by FDIs. 
2. SMART GRID AND ENERGY DISTRIBUTION 
In a smart grid, entities are connected to the grid via ICT infrastructures and power lines. 
Energy is transmitted from energy-rich to energy-poor entities as per energy-distribution 
mechanisms. Figure 1 illustrates an example of a two-layer topology of a smart grid. 
The upper layer represents the nation-wide backbone power transmission grids and ICT 
infrastructures, where each node is an abstraction that represents the average energy 
demand/supply of a local area (e.g. a town). Due to the difference in local energy needs and 
heterogeneous efficiencies of energy generation, each node in the grid will generate and consume 
different amounts of energy. When a node consumes more energy than it generates, the node is 
  
denoted as an energy-demand node, which needs to pull energy from the grid; similarly, when a 
node consumes less energy than it generates, the node is denoted as an energy-supply node, which 
pushes residual energy into the grid. 
 
Figure 1. A conceptual illustration of cyber-physical topologies in a smart grid system. 
At the lower layer, smart meters are installed in every entity (e.g. house, factory and school) 
that contains both power consuming facilities and energy producing equipment. Different from 
the traditional power meters that gather raw measurements (e.g. voltage and electrical current), 
smart meters are capable of further inferring state estimations (e.g. energy demands/supplies) and 
make preliminary decisions (e.g. data fusion) before these estimations reach control centres. With 
the information obtained from smart meters, energy distribution can be optimised with regard to 
various power grid performance metrics. For example, they may maximise the network utility and 
energy usage efficiency, while minimising energy transmission costs and user outage numbers 
[6].  
3. FDI ATTACKS IN SMART GRIDS 
Although smart components such as smart meters play an important role in smart grids, they 
increase the vulnerability of the grid system. In smart grids, these components are typically 
connections to the local networks or the Internet. Therefore, as the number of access points 
increase, compared with traditional power grids, smart grids are more prone to cyber-attacks [2, 
6]. Among these attacks, the most critical attack is false data injection (FDI) [2]. Adversaries can 
launch these attacks to compromise raw measurements or state estimations [3, 6]. 
  
These FDI attacks have been found to be launched by consumers and adversaries on purpose 
[2]. Consumers typically cheat the system by manipulating their energy consumption to reduce 
their energy bills. Adversaries, who can be opponent companies or countries, would aim to 
compromise state estimation (as described in Section 2) to increase the cost of energy distribution 
and smart-grid operations.  Considering the degree of these effects, the latter attacks are more 
critical for smart grids. False energy demand and supply can disrupt the energy distribution 
process, which may result in significant financial loss and even devastating outcomes. 
3.1 FDI Attack Targets 
The four most critical state estimations and the potential FDI attack targets related to these 
are listed as follows: 
 Energy demand. The untruthful values of this state estimation are critical as they can 
dramatically increase financial costs to both the energy users and providers due to the extra 
cost of power transmission and the waste of energy that can occur. Moreover, they can result 
in even a more devastating crisis, i.e. power outage, where energy requests to the smart grid 
is less than the energy demand that nodes truly require. Since these nodes consist of energy 
consumers, such as personal users or companies, the adversary may launch such attacks 
through either infected personal devices such as laptops, or through poorly configured 
firewalls [2].  
 Energy supply. The value of this state estimation is mainly provided by energy-supply 
nodes. FDIs can falsely decrease the advertised quantity of their supplied energy, which 
typically results in the starvation of energy-demand nodes who are not receiving what they 
request. Reversely, a falsely advertised increase in energy supply can incur an increase of 
wasted energy. These attacks can be achieved using malware to infect the servers of power 
suppliers, falsifying the quantity of energy it can truly provide.    
 Grid-network states. The grid-network states are the configurations and conditions of the 
power grids, such as grid topologies and power-lines capacities. For instance, adversaries 
can isolate nodes from the power grid by invaliding their power-line connection. 
Maliciously forging the network states can seriously mislead the energy distribution, again 
resulting in devastating power shortage or extra energy transmission costs.  
 Electricity Pricing. Dynamic electricity pricing can not only greatly reduce the electricity 
bill of consumers, such as energy-utility companies and houses, but also help balancing the 
power loads between peak and off-peak periods. Therefore, fake electricity pricing would 
produce significant damage to both the financial and physical subsystems that make up a 
  
smart grid; negating their advantages of optimum supply efficiencies. For instance, 
adversaries can falsely reduce the prices during peak hours which will ultimately result in 
grid system overload. Also, some illegal users may use malware to modify their energy bills, 
leading to a loss of utility company revenue. 
4. DETECTING FDI ATTACKS  
Detection is the most essential step in minimising the damages resulting from the 
aforementioned FDI attacks. Therefore, the efficiency and effectiveness of FDI detection 
techniques have significant impacts on the overall performance of smart grid systems. 
4.1 Traditional Solutions for FDI Detection 
Since the smart grid is a relatively new topic compared to traditional power-grid systems, the 
main research on countermeasures against FDIs are mainly system-theoretic approaches [3, 7, 8]. 
In these approaches, the relationship between raw meter measurements and system states are 
simply described as  ⃗    ⃗   ⃗ , where the matrix   represents system configuration, and 
vectors  ⃗ ,  ⃗ , and  ⃗  represent the meter measurements, state estimations, and meter 
measurement errors respectively. Therefore, for a predicted state  ̂, abnormal values can be 
detected by computing the 2-Norm of its measurement residual ‖    ̂‖.   will be considered 
to be abnormal, if ‖    ̂‖ is larger than a given threshold  . 
Recent research [3] demonstrates that this traditional countermeasure approach can be easily 
bypassed if adversaries are capable of accessing enough meters and inject malicious data to the 
grid with specific values. Also, this traditional solution can only detect abnormality at the group 
level (each of which contains several meters). Abnormality in each individual meter is 
unobservable in this solution. Although some approaches try to solve this problem, such as [7], 
they are unable to guarantee the security of smart-grid systems, since they are limited to 
traditional power grid scenarios, where adversaries can only assess physical meters. Therefore, 
attacks through cyber infrastructures can directly compromise state estimations without being 
detected by the detection approaches in traditional power-grid systems [2].  
4.2 Anomaly Detection for FDI Attacks 
 Since FDI attacks would result in abnormal state estimations, we can apply anomaly 
detection techniques [4] to smart grids, which has been studied in various areas such as cyber 
intrusion, sensor networks, and image processing [4]. In current research on intrusion detection, 
rule-based mechanisms are the simplest solutions. They typically exploit static thresholds to 
identify anomalies. When the value of a raw data input exceeds these thresholds, this value is 
regarded anomalous. These schemes introduce very low overhead to the system, but they fail to 
  
adapt to valid changes in the environment. Furthermore, a high level of professionalism is 
required to manually maintain detection thresholds.  
To cope with the dynamics and heterogeneities in environments, machine-learning-based 
solutions are more often exploited [4]. Statistical models (e.g. Bayesian, k-nearest neighbour) and 
artificial intelligence (e.g. neural networks) are typical approaches utilized to distinguish 
anomalies from norms. However, these solutions are usually complex, which limits their 
scalability when applying to large complicated networks, such as smart grids. Therefore, to 
achieve a more balanced solution, further assumptions are usually made to reduce computational 
complexity. Here we exploit the most, one simple general assumption: spatiotemporal 
correlation. 
5. SPATIO AND TEMPORAL CORRELATIONS IN SMART GRIDS 
Spatiotemporal correlation is a natural property found in various physical phenomena 
including human behaviours, since they are typically continuous over both the time and spatial 
domains. Since cyber states are mappings to these phenomena, the estimations of these states 
within a correlated sphere should also be spatiotemporally correlated. In general, the following 
correlations exist in smart grid systems:  
 Traditional power suppliers usually generate energy based on the current needs of 
power consumers. Typically, to reduce the extra overhead caused by energy storage, 
traditional power suppliers (such as fossil-fuel power stations) are inclined to dynamically 
adapt their power generation to the requirements of consumers. Therefore, these power 
suppliers, in the same area, can be spatially temporally correlated as they should all reflect 
the current state of power consumption nearby.  
 Renewable-energy suppliers are typically correlated to nearby suppliers. As renewable 
energy comes from natural resources (such as solar and wind power), energy generators, e.g. 
wind farms and hydroelectricity plants, deployed in a nearby area should be able to 
simultaneously reveal the current state of the environment therein. That is, they are spatially 
correlated. Also, these spatial correlations should be similar to those that have occurred in 
the past, i.e. these energy supplies are temporally correlated, as natural resources are 
continuous and should therefore result in interrelated effects to these power suppliers. 
 Energy consumers within the same area should behave in similar patterns. In general, 
power consumption in a related area should simultaneously reflect the current state of this 
region, such as weather, activities, and government policies. For example, in winter, power 
consumers of nearby cities tend to expend more power supplies than in summer due the use 
  
of heaters, even when each individual has its own patterns regarding power consumption. 
The total node behaviour can still be consistent and correlated to other consumer nodes at 
higher abstractions (such as districts of a city) therefore. 
6. REAL-TIME CORRELATION-BASED FDI DETECTION 
In order to minimise the damage of FDIs in smart grid systems, we propose an effective 
real-time mechanism to detect FDI attacks against state estimation in smart grid systems, based 
on the spatiotemporal cyber-state correlations discussed in Section 5. We call strongly 
spatiotemporally correlated smart components as neighbours. Potential anomalies can be detected 
by monitoring the temporal consistencies of the spatial correlations between state estimations. 
This detection mechanism can be divided into the following three phases, discussed below. 
6.1 Spatial-Pattern Recognition & Temporal-Pattern-Consistencies Evaluation 
This phase models the current states of the smart grid as its normal-state references (i.e. the 
state without FDI attacks). This phase is a semi-supervised process, similar to many other 
machine-learning mechanisms [4]. In our approach, correlation patterns are recognised between 
each pair of state estimations within the same correlation sphere defined by smart-grid operators, 
rather than the whole network. A correlation sphere typically contains several smart meters while 
a smart meter may simultaneously belong to multiple correlation spheres. The defining of 
correlation spheres can guarantee that all the smart components are spatially and temporally 
correlated, which is required by our approach. This design also avoids the high computational 
complexity when analysing data over high-dimensional spaces [4]. 
We assume that genuine changes and errors in state estimations follow Gaussian 
distributions, which is a common assumption [4]. Let    ( ) denote the state estimation of a 
smart component   (e.g. a photoelectric energy harvester) at current time  . The sequence of 
previous   state estimations for a smart component i before current time t can be represented as 
   (   )  (  (   )   (     )     (   ))                  (1) 
We consider each pair of smart components   and   in a correlation sphere  , such as a set 
of correlated photoelectric-energy harvesters in a town. Based on their previous state 
estimations   (   ) and    (   ), we can compute their Spatial-Correlation Consistency Region 
(SCCR), which represents the set of all possible potentially correct estimation pairs of   ( ) and 
  ( ) at current time  . If the current estimation pair (  ( )   ( )) belongs to the set defined by 
the SCCR, we say the current estimations   ( ) and   ( ) are consistent; otherwise, they are 
inconsistent.  
  
Geometrically, SCCR can be approximated by a rotated ellipse as illustrated in Figure 2 
Here, the centre of the SCCR ellipse, ( ̅ ( )  ̅ ( ))  is computed by using the Exponential 
Weighted Moving average (EWMA) for the previous estimations   (   ) and   (   ).The 
major and minor axes of the SCCR ellipse are computed by using principal component analysis 
(PCA), based on the previous estimations   (   ) and   (   )  In our approach, PCA is a 
mathematical procedure to convert observations of multiple observers into two orthogonal 
principal components    and  ⃗  (which define the rotation angle  ) and their associated 
variances   
 and    
 . We set the lengths of these axes as the three deviations     and    , 
which cover 99.46% normal observations respectively. 
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Figure 2. Illustration of a spatial correlation consistency region. 
6.2 Trust-based Voting 
After the correlation mapping consistency between each pair of state estimations is obtained, 
trust-based voting is exploited to identify the occurrences of anomalies. This voting is divided 
into two different rounds. In the first round, reliable state estimations are selected with the votes 
from the state estimations of their correlation neighbours. For a smart component   in a 
correlation sphere  , define its correlation neighbour set      as the set of all devices in   
excluding  ; and define its consistent neighbour set   
     as a set of devices, where the state 
estimation   ( ) of each device   in   
  are consistent with the state estimation   ( ). Take 
Figure 3 for instance,    {       },    {       },   
  {       }, and   
  { }.  
  
Let      and    
    represent the sizes of sets    and  
   respectively. We say that 
component   and its estimation   ( ) are likely to be reliable (LR) at time  , if    
         
   . Otherwise, we say that the smart component   and its estimation   ( ) are likely to be 
anomalous (LA) at time  . After the first round voting, smart component   and its current state 
estimation are LA while others are LR, as shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Visualization of a trust-based voting example. 
After the first round voting, only LR components and their state estimations are qualified to 
involve in the second round voting, such as A, B, C, D in Figure 3. For a smart component  , 
define   
      as the set of all LR components in the correlation sphere   excluding  ; and 
  
    
   as the set of all LR components that are consistent with  . For instance,   
   
{       }  and   
  { } , shown in Figure 3. The second round voting for state 
estimation   ( ) has one of the following three outcomes: 
 GOOD, if |  
 | |  
  |          |  
  |         ⁄⁄ ; 
 ABNORMAL, if |  
 | |  
  |          |  
  |         ⁄⁄ ; 
 UNKNOWN, otherwise 
It can be seen that we can determine whether    ( ) is GOOD or ABNORMAL, if the 
majority of i's neighbours are labelled as LR at slot t; otherwise, the reliability of    ( ) is unable 
to be determined (i.e. UNKNOWN), due to the lack of reliable references. 
6.3 System condition inference 
We further infer the phenomena that the three outcomes represent. Firstly, GOOD indicates 
that current state estimation   ( )  is reliable, since it is highly correlated to other state 
  
estimations which are in the same correlation sphere  . This usually suggests that the state 
estimation is in a stable state and probably normal. On the contrary, ABNORMAL indicates the 
value of   ( ) deviates from the majority of state estimations in the same correlation group  . 
This typically suggests an abnormality in   ( ), which can either be due to failures or an FDI 
attack. Finally, the UNKNOWN occurs when there are not enough state estimations that can be 
regarded as reliable references when we compute the reliabilities. This happens when there is an 
extensive change among the state estimations in   due to genuine occasions that dramatically 
change the behaviour of the smart grid or large-scale attacks, which should be regarded as an 
indispensable event that requires further inspection from system administrators.  
6.4 Practical Issues 
Except for assuming spatiotemporal relationships and that errors follow Gaussian distributions, 
we do not require any further assumptions. Therefore, the proposed FDI detection mechanism is 
quite general and can be used for heterogeneous types of correlated components in the smart grid 
systems. When we apply the proposed detection mechanism to practical smart grid systems, the 
window size of previous state estimations, T, should be considered. This is a user defined 
parameter, which decides the computation of the SCCR (i.e. the ellipse shown in Figure 2). 
Consequently, users should carefully assign T according to their practical scenarios to assure that 
the entire state estimations that lie in this interval are temporally correlated, while avoiding 
unnecessary extra storage and computational overheads. 
7. A CASE STUDY 
To demonstrate how FDI attacks would impact the energy distribution of a smart grid system, 
we conducted an evaluation based on a simplified version of the US smart grid consisting of 48 
states shown in Figure 4 (http://www.oe.energy.gov/smartgrid.htm.). Furthermore, to simulate 
local energy generation and consumption of each state, we decomposed each state into 10 energy 
suppliers and 10 energy consumers. Each of these suppliers/consumers contains 365 daily energy 
generation/consumption profiles, which is correlated to other suppliers/consumers in the same 
state, to simulate the annual behaviour of the smart-grid system. All these profiles are based on 
the 2009 US Energy Information Administration State Electricity Profiles (available on 
http://www.eia.gov/). 
  
 
Figure 4. A simplified US smart grid topology. 
In this simulation, we study two different types of FDI attacks. The first one aims to increase 
the total energy transmission cost [3]. In this scenario, FDI attacks were randomly inserted to 
increase the advertised supply-demand values of suppliers and consumers by 15% and then 30% , 
i.e.       false and      false shown in Figure 5 (a). The total energy transmission cost 
           is defined as: 
          ∑ (|   |        )                              (2) 
, where   denotes the set of all power lines in a given smart-grid system;     denotes the power 
line between supplier   and consumer  ;     denotes the amount of energy transmitted through 
power line     while        denotes the cost of power transmission per unit through power line 
   . 
The second FDI attacks aim to promote significant power-supply outage. The demands of 
energy consumers were falsely increased by 1 and 2 times, i.e.    false and    false shown 
in Figure 5 (b), while the advertised supplies were falsely decreased by 10% and 20%. The user 
outage rate      is defined as:  
     
                            
                               
 
Figure 5 shows the simulation results when applying our FDI-detection approach and the 
state-of-the-art distanced-based (DB) solution proposed in 2013 [9] [10]. Both approaches 
referenced the past 30 days data during evaluation (i.e.     ). Also, we set the user-defined 
Power Line
  
parameters of the distanced-based solution as       and       [9]. Note that since there 
were no false-positive detections caused by our approach in the cost-increasing scenario, it cannot 
be plot under log scale in Figure 5 (c). 
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Figure 5. The correlation between (a) energy transmission cost (b) user outage rate (c) 
false-positive detection rate, and attack probability for different attack criteria; and (d) 
required simulation time. 
As can be seen in Figure 5 (a) and (b), both FDI-detection mechanisms can significantly 
reduce the adverse impacts caused by FDIs. In the cost-increasing experiment, our solution 
reduced up to 1.14 million US dollars without any false-positive detection. Furthermore, our 
approach can achieve about 55.5 % user outage reduction with only 0.43% false-positives. 
In contrast, although the DB-detection scheme achieves comparable performance in 
detection FDIs, it suffers from extremely high false-positive detection rates, which means that it 
misreports correct state estimations when FDI attacks with a high probability. As can be observed 
in Figure 5 (c), false-positive detections are increasing as the FDI-attack rate increases for both 
schemes; however, compared with our approach, DB detection incurs nearly two-orders of 
magnitude more false-positive results. Such high false-positive detection rate of DB-detection 
scheme would result in significant confusion in decision making and would incur additional costs, 
such as extra labour to understand the problem where the integrity of the information is required 
to be checked manually, i.e. interpreted by human beings.  
Furthermore, as shown in Figure 5 (d), the computational overhead of our approach is 
extremely low, i.e. nearly two-orders of magnitude less than that of DB-detection. This 
demonstrates that our approach has a great potential to be applied for real-time FDI attack 
detection in smart grid systems. 
8. CONCLUSION  
Compared to traditional power grids, smart grids are predicted to be more reliable and 
effective energy-distribution solutions that can cope with the complicated power supply and 
demand scenarios. However, they have the potential to be more vulnerable to cyber-attacks such 
as from malware or malicious cyber-intrusions. Among all these attacks, the most critical ones are 
false-data injection (FDI). Adversaries can launch these attacks to compromise raw meter 
measurements or state estimations. This can significantly disrupt the effectiveness of the energy 
distribution in smart grids, which results in additional costs or some hazard that would have larger 
impacts, such as blackouts or enormous costs. 
Recent approaches to identifying FDIs are less effective as they assume the technical 
architecture of traditional power grids. In this article, we propose a simple and robust solution to 
detecting false data injection in smart grid systems that consist of many differing ICT components. 
This solution exploits spatiotemporal cyber-state correlations and trust-based voting to evaluate 
  
the reliabilities of state estimations. FDIs can be detected once those unreliable state estimations 
are identified. A case study is presented to demonstrate the impacts of FDIs with our approach 
verses the nearest state of the art approach. The simulation results show that the proposed solution 
can effectively and efficiently detect malicious FDIs and prevent potential extra costs and 
security threats. 
Even with our solution, smart-grid systems remain vulnerable to some FDIs such as those 
that slowly evolve to prevent detection, as well as other sorts of attacks both physical and 
computational. Therefore, more powerful countermeasures are required as these attacks can 
become potential threats to national security and citizen wellbeing. 
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